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Is the Prohibition Against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment Really ‘Absolute’ in International Human 






In two articles published in this journal I argued that the prohibition against torture, 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is not genuinely absolute in international 
human rights law as almost universally supposed. Neil Graffin and Natasa 
Mavronicola have recently offered critiques. But each, regrettably, suffers from 
three fatal defects: most of my arguments are simply ignored, I’ve already 
thoroughly explored every single one of those addressed, and their attempts to 
concede certain elements of my case in order to defend a narrower conception of 
absoluteness fails. What follows is a brief response to set the record straight. 
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Had it been made in an academic context, Oscar Wilde’s famous quip – ‘the only thing worse 
than being talked about is not being talked about’ – might have been rendered: ‘the only thing 
worse than being criticised is being ignored’. I’m grateful, therefore, to Mavronicola and 
Graffin for taking the time and trouble to reply2 to my recent contributions to the debate about 
the absoluteness of the prohibition against torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
                                                          
1 Professor of Human Rights, University of Bristol Law School. 
2 N. Graffin, ‘Gäfgen v Germany, the Use of Threats and the Punishment of Those Who Ill-treat During Police 
Questioning: A Reply to Steven Greer’ (2017) 17 Human Rights Law Review 681; N. Mavronicola, ‘Is the 
Prohibition Against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Absolute in International Human 




(TCIDT) in international human rights law.3 But regrettably their earnest and well-intentioned 
contributions suffer from three fundamental defects – most of my arguments are simply 
ignored, I’ve already thoroughly explored every single one of those they address, and their 
attempts to defend a narrower conception of absoluteness by conceding certain elements of my 
case ultimately fails. Their own-goal interventions, nevertheless, provide a welcome 
opportunity for the weaknesses in the absolutist case to be further exposed.  
 
Let me begin by reminding readers of my motives in this debate. For many years I stood in 
front of numerous human rights classes retailing the absolutist orthodoxy. Then came the 
Gäfgen case. German police officers who had threatened Magnus Gäfgen, a child kidnapper, 
with torture unless he told them where he’d taken his victim, Jakob von Metzler, were 
prosecuted, tried and received suspended fines for the offences involved. Though the leniency 
of the punishment called the absoluteness of the prohibition into question, to me this seemed a 
sensible outcome. But I was greatly troubled by the judgment of the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Ignoring Jakob’s right not to suffer TCIDT as a 
result of the kidnapping, and dismissing the risk that he might have been dying as a result, the 
Court held that only a heavy sentence would have been appropriate for the violation of 
Gäfgen’s ‘absolute’ rights under Article 3 ECHR not to be subject to TCIDT.  Frankly, if this 
is where the human rights ideal inescapably takes us, I would want nothing further to do with 
it. But then I realised that the source of my disquiet lay in some widely-ignored, but 
fundamental, problems with the concept of absoluteness in this context. Although, as I’ve 
repeatedly said, there is ultimately no completely satisfactory solution to the legal or moral 
dilemmas involved, in my opinion the challenges – including those presented by at least certain 
versions of ‘the ticking bomb scenario’ – should be more coherently, honestly and squarely 
addressed. Let me reprise my case once again before considering the critiques offered by 
Graffin and Mavronicola. 
 
 
                                                          
3 S. Greer, ‘Should Police Threats to Torture Suspects Always be Severely Punished? Reflections on the Gäfgen 
case’ (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review 67-89 and ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment Really ‘Absolute’ in International Human Rights Law?’ (2015) 15 Human Rights Law 






2. THE CASE AGAINST THE ABSOLUTENESS OF THE PROHIBITION IN 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
No credible contributor to the ‘absoluteness debate’ argues that officials should be entitled to 
subject those under their control to TCIDT as a matter of routine fully sanctioned by law. The 
only area of real controversy is whether any exceptions can be identified in which such conduct 
could ever be justified or excused, if so what legal status it would have, and what should be 
done with those who resort to it in such circumstances. According to one view, the suffering 
of a kidnap victim or the many likely to be killed or injured when a ticking bomb explodes, 
matters less than guaranteeing that the perpetrator is protected even from mild suffering which, 
had it been inflicted, might have averted the calamity. The other view is that, since the 
prohibition against TCIDT derives from the moral impulse to eliminate, or at least reduce, all 
forms of deliberately occasioned and unjustified harm, it is difficult to see why the culprit’s 
right to be spared even threats must always and invariably outweigh the injury and death caused 
by a kidnapping or exploding time bomb.  
 
While this dilemma is certainly moral, it cannot be avoided in international human rights law 
either. Upon closer examination it turns out that the absoluteness of the prohibition in this 
context is, in fact, based on a problematic moral choice masquerading as an objective and 
inescapable legal imperative, typically supported and defended by bald assertion, blind faith, 
intellectual tunnel vision, and by appeals to authority rather than to reason. The core problem 
is that absoluteness is not an express, inherent, self-evident, or necessary feature of the formally 
unqualified international provisions in question and the fact that no limitations are specified is 
not a good enough reason to regard them, and the rights and duties they imply, as absolute. For 
one thing, implied rights limited by implicit exceptions are uncontroversially derived from 
other formally unqualified human rights-related provisions. Many subtle and sophisticated 
arguments have been advanced by philosophers for and against the concept of absolute rights, 
and about which deserve this status. Yet, rather than engaging with these, and coupled with an 
unwillingness to imagine the possibility of any legitimate exception, judges, lawyers and jurists 
have instead simply assumed that absolute rights and obligations must be derived from the 
relevant international legal provisions because no limitations are expressed.  
 
However, the inescapable fact is that, when two instances of the same ‘absolute right’ come 




each to be equally absolute. In such circumstances, one must inevitably take precedence over 
the other, with the one which does providing an exception to, or a limitation upon, the other. 
The key questions then become: which is which and why? When such a dilemma arises no 
morally or legally watertight solution can be found. But the only route to the least objectionable 
outcome is that the ‘lesser of the two evils’ should prevail, determined by an accommodation 
between the competing prohibitions, interests, and rights which best expresses their underlying 
rationale. Non-absolute interpretations of the prohibition against TCIDT are not only possible, 
but in fact formally and expressly underpin similar provisions in some celebrated national 
human rights instruments including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982, the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the South African Bill of Rights 1996. This raises 
the following questions: which formulation—absolute or non-absolute—is more appropriate 
and why? The claim that the obligations and rights under consideration are ‘absolute in 
principle’ but ‘relative in application’ is also unconvincing since it facilitates the rebranding of 
a legitimate exception as a mere failure to satisfy threshold criteria, thereby misleadingly 
appearing to leave their absolute status intact. Nor does it follow, because the term ‘inhuman 
or degrading’ treatment (with ‘cruel’ sometimes added) is typically included in the same 
provision of any given international human rights instrument prohibiting torture, that each of 
these very different forms of harmful conduct must necessarily share the same status.  
 
It is also difficult to sustain the view that the rights and obligations in question are legally 
absolute, but that the Gäfgen case may constitute a rare moral exception, or that it suggests 
merely an argument about what the law ought to be rather than what it is. Since human rights 
norms gain their legal authority because of their moral weight, without minimal moral 
credibility it is difficult to see what legal status they can possibly have. The fact that Jakob was 
already dead when Gäfgen was threatened with torture, and that the police may not have 
exhausted all options short of the threat, are also contingent but not necessary features of the 
moral and legal dilemmas the case presents. It could easily have been otherwise and, at the 
material time, only Gäfgen knew Jakob’s real fate. Nor is it appropriate to frame the conflict 
exclusively in terms of the kidnap victim’s right to life and the suspected kidnapper’s right not 
to be threatened with torture since there may well be a conflict between the latter and the kidnap 
victim’s right not to suffer whatever TCIDT the kidnapping itself may be causing. It has also 
yet to be satisfactorily explained why, provided no more force than absolutely necessary is 
used, police officers may lawfully shoot to kill hostage-takers and not breach their human 




victims or preventing a ticking bomb from exploding must be severely punished in all 
circumstances without exception. Claiming that the threat of torture violates ‘dignity’ but that 
shooting to kill does not, begs a simple question to which there is no convincing answer – why? 
The claim that the prohibition in question is absolute against agents of the state but not against 
private parties is also unsustainable for two main reasons: if true, it would constitute an 
acknowledgement that it is, in fact, subject to implicit exceptions; and it would also fail to 
provide a solution to the hypothetical problem that if Gäfgen had been a rogue police officer, 
there would have been a conflict between two competing sets of Article 3 rights (his and 
Jakob’s) each against the state. Privileging the negative obligation held by the police to refrain 
from mistreating suspects over their positive obligation to rescue victims of crime, or framing 
the issue in terms of ‘inherent rights and wrongs’ rather than absolute rights and obligations, 
also merely recasts rather than resolves the dilemma. Convincing reasons independent of these 
considerations need to be found to justify this order of priorities in all circumstances. None has 
yet been provided. It does not follow either that, because the implications of the Gäfgen case 
are consequence-sensitive, a utilitarian political morality is necessarily invoked since the 
human rights ideal itself prioritises the pursuit of certain outcomes over others.  
 
In all probability the Gäfgen case is a unique aberration. However, its importance lies less in 
debating what the solution to the actual facts should have been, and more in seeking to 
determine what kind of norms should apply in a range of circumstances, including where the 
mere threat of mistreatment had resulted in Jakob’s life being saved. It also shows, for example, 
how a conceptually flawed interpretation of a fundamental norm in international human rights 
law can lead to substantive injustice in hitherto unforeseen circumstances. There are no credible 
grounds either for fearing law enforcement will slither down a slippery slope towards the more 
routine official use of TCIDT unless the absoluteness of the prohibition is rigorously upheld. 
For one thing, neither the slippery slope nor the ‘noble lie’ (affirming that the prohibition is 
absolute when we know it isn’t) have been encountered in Canada, New Zealand or South 
Africa where the prohibition and rights in question are expressly non-absolute. Nor is it clear 
why the absence of an absolute prohibition on the official use of lethal force does not also 
create the risk of a slide down a different slippery slope. It is also not clear why the potential 
unreliability of information obtained in Gäfgen-type circumstances should be regarded as less 
amenable to morally responsible risk management than that posed by any other type the 
veracity of which cannot be guaranteed. The Gäfgen case also illustrates how attempting to 




transcendent, omnipotent, supra-human qualities to what are no more than human-made 
standards in order to avoid making intuitively sound, emotionally convincing, and rationally 
defensible, moral choices to resolve intractable normative dilemmas.  
 
It is more important, therefore, that those with control over others should understand that 
credible allegations of TCIDT should result in prosecution and, if proven, are likely to lead to 
punishment. There is no need to invoke the concept of absoluteness at all to make this message 
clear. It would have been wiser and more credible, therefore, if, prior to the Gäfgen case, the 
eminent legal authorities which have so repeatedly and unreflectively affirmed the absoluteness 
of the prohibition, had avoided the term ‘absolute’ altogether and instead had simply stated that 
it is difficult to imagine any circumstances in which TCIDT could be justified. This would have 
sent, and would continue to send, an appropriate message to officials and others entirely 
consistent with the implications of the Gäfgen case: any resort to TCIDT will expose those 
responsible to the prospect of potentially severe punishment. It is open to further debate 
whether a defence of necessity in Gäfgen-type circumstances could ever negate either criminal 
liability and/or moral culpability rather than merely mitigating punishment. But, if the threat 
results in a life or lives being saved, it is difficult to see why the police officers involved deserve 
to be punished at all, let alone severely as the judgment of the majority of the Grand Chamber 
logically implies. Rather than repeating the empty mantra of ‘absoluteness’, the challenge is to 
specify conditions which limit any exception to the most extreme circumstances. Hiding behind 
it is merely an evasion of the responsibility inherent in a full commitment to human rights to 
decide for sound reasons, where suffering cannot be avoided, whose matters most—suspects, 
victims, and potential victims included. 
 
3. THE CRITIQUES 
 
Ignoring most of this, Mavronicola’s critique rests upon four central claims: the prohibition is 
self-evidently and necessarily absolute because no limits are specified; a proper appreciation 
of the distinction between negative and positive obligations reveals that there is no conflict of 
rights in Gäfgen-type circumstances; shooting to kill hostage-takers in order to rescue hostages 
may sometimes be justified under international human rights law but never threatening them 
with torture to achieve the same purpose because the latter involves a violation of dignity and 
agency while the former does not; affirming the absoluteness of the prohibition in international 




TCIDT, or with wider issues including the question of individual criminal liability for violation 
and the ‘ticking bomb scenario’. Graffin is primarily concerned with contesting the lenient 
sentences the police officers in the Gäfgen case in fact received. But he also considers the 
slippery slope argument and, like Mavronicola, the formal character of the prohibition and 
rights in question, conflicts of rights, and the positive and negative obligations involved.  
 
A. The prohibition is absolute because no exceptions are specified 
 
Both Graffin and Mavronicola claim that, as the former puts it, ‘the right’ in Article 3 ECHR 
‘is framed in absolute terms.’4 This is quite simply wrong. Nor, in spite of Mavronicola’s 
professed difficulties with the terms, is there any ambiguity about what ‘inherent legal 
necessity’ or the risk of ascribing a transcendent, omnipotent, supra-human quality to the 
prohibition (what some authors refer to as ‘legal fetishism’) mean. The issue is crystal clear. 
Article 3, and other canonical formulations, are framed as imperatives or prohibitions and do 
not in fact contain any express rights at all. Nor are they expressly absolute. They are merely 
formally unqualified. In other words, no exceptions are expressly specified. But, it is well 
recognised that any rights which may derive from a formally unqualified prohibition may have 
implied exceptions. To discover if there are any, and if so what they are, requires the exercise 
of judgment and reason, stemming from a proper understanding of how all relevant 
considerations can be reconciled, and not simply bald assertion as was the case for absoluteness 
in this context until the recent debate. The alleged absolute status of Article 3 is, therefore, a 
matter of choice and attribution not an inherent and inescapable feature of the provision itself. 
This is further demonstrated by the fact, which both Graffin and Mavronicola completely 
ignore, that the text of Article 3 which eventually found its way into the final draft of the ECHR, 
was a compromise between expressly limited and expressly absolute versions. Mavronicola’s 
claim – that denying the inescapable absoluteness of the prohibition ‘attacks the foundational 
core of the legal protection of human rights as enshrined in the ECHR and other instruments’5 
– is also wide of the mark, not least because absoluteness is patently not inescapable.  
 
Graffin also undermines the absolutist case by conceding that: ‘Although Article 3 is framed 
in absolute terms, there is a moral judgment to be made to decide when something is acceptable 
                                                          
4 Graffin, supra n 2, at 685, 686. 




or not for that “absoluteness” to be triggered’.6 But, if it has to be ‘triggered’, it cannot be 
genuinely absolute because the occasions in which it is not triggered constitute exceptions to 
the relevant prohibition and rights.  
 
B. Conflicts of rights and positive and negative obligations  
 
In spite of having explored the issue at length in my 2015 article, according to Mavronicola, I, 
nevertheless, fail to understand the distinction between the state’s negative obligation to refrain 
from subjecting those under its control to TCIDT, and its positive obligation to take reasonable 
steps to protect those within its jurisdiction from suffering the same fate at the hands of 
someone else. As a result, I have mistakenly concluded that a conflict arises in the Gäfgen case 
between Jakob’s right not to suffer TCIDT as a result of the kidnapping, and Gäfgen’s right 
not to suffer the inhuman treatment of being threatened with torture for failing to disclose 
Jakob’s whereabouts thereby obstructing rescue. Graffin acknowledges that ‘absolute’ rights 
can conflict and that this occurred in the Gäfgen case but offers no reasons for preferring 
Gäfgen’s over Jakob’s that haven’t already been thoroughly discredited.  
 
According to Mavronicola, there is no such conflict because each obligation is owed by 
different parties. In a nutshell my response to this criticism is similar to the one offered in the 
section above. Mavronicola’s view is a matter of interpretation and attribution rather than 
necessity, legal or otherwise. I readily admit that the state has a limited legal obligation to 
protect those within its jurisdiction from inflicting TCIDT upon each other and that it also has 
a much more compelling legal obligation not to mistreat those under the control of its own 
agents. In fact, as I acknowledge in the 2015 article, the latter is virtually absolute. But the core 
question is whether it applies even in unique and extreme circumstances such as those 
presented by the Gäfgen case. For all the reasons already given, I say that it does not and should 
not. Mavronicola claims that the ‘positive obligations to take all reasonable measures, 
including operational measures, to protect Jakob would not include a duty to act in a way which 
is absolutely prohibited.’7 But this is a circular argument which assumes the absoluteness of 
the prohibition in order to demonstrate its absoluteness. Arguments of a similarly circular kind 
                                                          
6 Graffin, supra n 2 at 686. 




also appear in the following paragraph on the same page, with reference to the state’s 
responsibilities had Gäfgen been a rogue police officer, and in other parts of her critique.8 
 
C. Shooting to kill hostage-takers and harming those under official control 
 
Mavronicola also fails to provide a convincing refutation of what she claims is my ‘strongest 
case’, that there is no good reason why shooting, and killing or permanently disabling, a 
hostage-taker to rescue a hostage may be permitted as a matter of international human rights 
law, but threatening them with torture can never be. According to her, the reason is that the 
former does not involve a violation of dignity or agency but the latter does. Frankly I simply 
don’t see it. In my view being severely disabled as a result of a gunshot intended to kill is a 
much more serious infringement of dignity and agency than the ten minutes of anxiety Gäfgen 
experienced as a result of having been threatened with torture. Each can also be justified 
depending upon the circumstances. Graffin also makes the telling observation that there are 
numerous occasions when inflicting pain or suffering upon those under official control can be 
justified, eg the imposition of solitary confinement as a proportionate punishment to breaches 
of custodial norms or the forced removal of a recalcitrant prisoner from his cell.9 But he fails 
to appreciate their full significance: if these kinds of suffering can be lawfully and morally 
inflicted in pursuit of the goals in question, why can the threat of torture never be used to rescue 
a kidnap victim or to prevent a potentially fatal explosion? As Graffin argues, the 
powerlessness of suspects in police interviews, and their right not to incriminate themselves, 
also provide compelling reasons for the prohibition of ill-treatment. But for these 
considerations to be conclusive requires further argument which he fails to supply. 
 
D. What to do with those who infringe the prohibition? 
 
Both Graffin and Mavronicola make fatal concessions to the case against the absoluteness of 
the prohibition by accepting that those who breach it may be entitled to leniency in punishment. 
Graffin’s position is, however, less than crystal clear because, like the majority of the Grand 
Chamber in the Gäfgen case, he castigates the German courts for the lenient punishment the 
                                                          
8 Ibid at 485, 488, 495; See also Graffin, supra n 2 at 693, 699.  




police officers received, but also argues that their sentences should have been proportionate 
and mitigated by the facts, yet without saying what precisely this would entail.  
 
For her part Mavronicola claims that the absolute character of the legal prohibition does not 
‘close off critical engagement’10 about the meaning of core terms in the debate, or with wider 
moral issues, including about criminal culpability for violation including in the ticking bomb 
scenario. Regrettably this adds further confusion to the absolutist case and requires several 
issues to be disentangled. First, I stand accused of having adopted an overly inclusive definition 
of absoluteness in order to set it up as a straw man to be easily knocked over. This is untrue. 
As with any concept, ‘absolute’ can be defined in various ways. But, at root, I have consistently 
endorsed the ordinary dictionary definition as employed in international human rights law 
particularly by the ECtHR – ‘not subject to any exceptions in any circumstances’. Mavronicola 
also proposes distinguishing ‘between the delimitation of the prohibition of torture and CIDT 
through the interpretation of its terms, and the application of exceptions, qualifications or 
derogations to the prohibition of torture and CIDT.’11 Since no account is provided to explain 
how an interpretative ‘delimitation’ does not amount to an exception, this appears to be a 
distinction without a difference. Mavronicola also fails to show why, because TCIDT are 
typically found together in the same provisions of international human rights law, they 
unquestionably deserve the same status. Her case is further undermined here by the same kind 
of circular argument that appears elsewhere in the critique.  
 
I have also been accused of conflating ‘the absolute character of the prohibition of torture and 
CIDT as it applies to the State under international human rights law with the contours of the 
criminal culpability, excusability and shades thereof of individuals’.12 Yet this is exactly what 
the majority of the Grand Chamber did in the Gäfgen case when it held, in effect, that any 
leniency in punishing breaches of the prohibition would compromise its absoluteness, 
including where threatening a kidnapper with torture would have saved the life of a kidnapped 
child. In an attempt to avoid this result, Mavronicola seeks to show that ‘any duty to punish 
individuals is not an essential parameter of the absoluteness of the prohibition in international 
human rights law, a prohibition which holds States liable for human rights violations.’13 Yet, 
                                                          
10 Mavronicola, supra n 2 at 479, 480. 
11 Ibid at 493. 
12 Ibid at 481, italics in original. 




for two main reasons, the endeavour fails. First, it is difficult to see in what sense a state is 
‘held liable’ where its own agents escape the penalty appropriate for violating an ‘absolute’ 
right. Second, one of the procedural obligations under Article 3 ECHR is to ensure that 
breaches are effectively sanctioned. The absoluteness of the prohibition becomes a hollow 
fiction where this is lenient because it suggests the prohibited conduct is less objectionable in 
some circumstances than in others. Whatever anyone might say, degrading treatment which 
barely crosses the Article 3 ECHR threshold is clearly not as unacceptable, legally or morally, 
as torture.  
 
However, since the prohibition is not genuinely absolute, the question of what to do with those 
who breach it does indeed need to be considered separately. In order to ensure public 
accountability, there should be a prosecution in all cases. Severe punishment will generally be 
merited. But in rare circumstances it should be lenient. In other, even rarer cases, especially 
where the mere threat saves a life or lives, it may be appropriate not to punish at all. 
Mavronicola dismisses the latter as involving a ‘dash of moral luck’14 as if this were obviously 
an inappropriate consideration. Yet ‘luck’ and ‘chance’ pervade law as they do life. A negligent 
motorist will, for example, not be liable for causing an accident, if the quick-thinking driver of 
an on-coming vehicle ‘luckily’ swerves to avoid what would otherwise have been a fatal head-
on collision. Nor will the offence of causing death by dangerous driving have been committed 
if, against the odds, the victim ‘luckily’ survives in spite of life-threatening injuries.  
 
I also stand accused of confusing absoluteness as matters of law and morality. Yet, as already 
indicated, both the 2011 and 2015 articles are consistently concerned with what absoluteness 
means as a matter of international human rights law. The clue is, for example, in the title of 
the latter. But as I have also argued, the distinction between law and morality is far from 
watertight because the status of the legal prohibition is a matter of extra-legal interpretive 
choice from which morality cannot credibly be excluded. Moreover, since legal human rights 
norms are simultaneously political and moral (with some economic and cultural besides) any 




                                                          






Some may think this debate is divorced from reality. After all it is agreed on all sides that the 
prohibition against TCIDT should be observed in (‘strictly’ or ‘virtually’) all circumstances 
and the occasions upon which any doubt may arise are very remote indeed. However, no one 
could seriously deny that the treatment a suspected kidnapper or bomber should receive from 
law enforcement officials seeking to rescue a kidnap victim or prevent a terrorist outrage are 
issues of considerable moral and legal importance.  
 
The key to understanding the prohibition, rights and duties in international human rights law 
lies in appreciating the issues arising on two principal dimensions: the formal and the moral. 
As for the former, the relevant texts, eg Article 3 ECHR, are framed as negative imperatives or 
prohibitions which are not expressly absolute, but merely formally unqualified. Indeed, the text 
of Article 3 ECHR was a compromise between expressly absolute and expressly limited 
alternatives. Moreover, since they do not contain any express rights at all, any rights to which 
they may give rise are, therefore, implicit rather than express. It is widely recognised that rights 
implied by formally unqualified imperatives or prohibitions may be subject to implicit 
exceptions. It is also logically impossible for each of two competing instances of the same 
‘absolute’ right to be equally absolute. One must take precedence over the other with the former 
becoming an exception to the latter. To find out whether the rights in question are subject to 
implied exceptions, and to determine which of two competing ‘absolute’ rights should prevail 
over the other and in what circumstances, requires moral judgment rather than the kind of bald 
assertion, supported by appeals to authority, which underpinned the absolutist case until the 
current debate began. This inescapably involves a quest for the least bad outcome which best 
expresses the underlying rationale of the prohibition, rights and obligations and also maximises 
their effectiveness.  
 
It is also agreed on all sides that ill-treatment of suspects in police custody, and in other 
contexts, should, as Graffin puts it, be ‘eliminated in so far as it is possible to do so’.15 The 
only matter for debate is how ‘far it is possible to do so’. Paradoxically, insisting upon the 
absoluteness of the prohibition in certain kidnapping and ticking bomb scenarios, weakens 
rather than strengthens its efficacy, because in these circumstances, it permits the rights of 
                                                          




innocent victims actually suffering, or about to suffer torture, to be subordinated to the right of 
culprits to avoid considerably less suffering in order to stop or prevent it. The greater suffering 
therefore occurs, not only because of the acts of those directly responsible for the kidnapping 
or the bomb, but also because significantly lesser suffering was not inflicted upon them which, 
had it been, would have avoided the greater suffering of their victims. As a result of the recent 
debate, it is now also clear that ‘absoluteness’ means something much more limited than it 
seemed at the outset. Graffin, for example, thinks it is ‘triggered’ only in some circumstances 
but not others, while Mavronicola speculates about the possibility of ‘delimiting the 
prohibition’ by interpreting its terms without its absoluteness being affected. Each also flirts 
with tolerating lenient punishment for infringement, believing that this also has no effect upon 
the absolute status of the prohibition. Yet all of these concessions inescapably imply that some 
infringements are less serious, more justified, and, therefore, less ‘absolutely’ prohibited than 
others. 
 
In all probability, as Mavronicola predicts and advocates, many including the ECtHR itself, 
will simply ignore the ‘anti-absolutist’ case and continue to affirm the orthodoxy regardless. 
Too much assertion, though very much less thought and argument, have certainly been invested 
in it over the past half century or so for it to be recanted without significant loss of face. But 
the problem with such a head-in-the-sand attitude is that it risks causing further damage, not 
only to the credibility of the ECtHR, but to the human rights ideal itself. A much more credible 
alternative would simply be to drop the term ‘absolute’ from the jurisprudence and the 
discourse altogether. There is no need whatsoever for it to be invoked in order to send a clear 
message to those with control over others that credible allegations of TCIDT should result in 
prosecution and, if proven, are likely to lead to potentially severe punishment. Whether, in 
exceptional circumstances, a defence of necessity could ever absolve those responsible from 
either criminal liability and/or moral culpability rather than merely mitigating punishment, is a 
matter for further discussion. While hard core absolutists are unlikely to change their minds, 
I’m confident that most who have yet to make up theirs will see the strength of the case for 
virtual absoluteness. After all, in addition to all the arguments already offered, it also chimes 
so much better than the case for strict absoluteness with the common-sense intuition that, at 
least in some circumstances, saving the lives of those who would otherwise suffer as a result 
of kidnapping or an exploding time bomb, matters more than protecting the kidnapper or 
bomber from the threat of TCIDT in order to avert it. However, whatever anyone thinks, this 




yet found a way of putting it back in. I doubt if anyone ever will. But if they can, I will gladly 
re-join the absolutist cause.  
 
